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Asadi: Renegade or Precursor of 
Who Is a Whistleblower Under the 
Dodd-Frank Act? 
 
Mystica M. Alexander, John O. Hayward, & David 
Missirian* 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Whistleblowers have a long and honorable history.  From 
Ralph Nader blowing the whistle on the hazards of GM’s Corvair 
in Unsafe at Any Speed1 in the 1960’s to Jeffrey Wigand in 1996 
exposing the duplicity of the tobacco industry,2 whistleblowers 
have put conscience ahead of career and personal success to 
expose corporate fraud and wrongdoing.  Not surprisingly, they 
have had to endure ridicule and ostracism as well as financial 
hardship.  Legislation has sought to protect them from 
retribution,3 often with mixed success.4  The most recent 
legislative effort is the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) that allows 
whistleblowers to collect a bounty for the whistleblowing5 and 
also protects the whistleblower from retaliatory acts by his or 
 
* Mystica Alexander is an Assistant Professor at Bentley University.  John 
Hayward is an Adjunct Senior Lecturer at Bentley University.  David 
Missirian is a Senior Lecturer at Bentley University. 
1. See RALPH NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED (1965). 
2. See Jeffrey Wigand on 60 Minutes, February 4, 1996, 
JEFFREYWIGAND.COM, http://www.jeffreywigand.com/60minutes.php (last 
visited Mar. 18, 2015). Wigand’s  whistle blowing was the subject of the film 
The Insider (1999). 
3. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2010). 
4. See Leonard M. Baynes, Just Pucker and Blow: An Analysis of 
Corporate Whistleblowers, 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 875, 891 (2002) (reporting that 
about 25-33% of whistleblower retaliation suits are successful).  See also Anne 
Kates Smith, The Elusive Rewards and High Costs of Being a Whistleblower, 
KIPLINGER, http://www.kiplinger.com/article/business/T012-C000-S002-high-
costs-of-being-a-whistleblower.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2015). 
5. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2012). 
1
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her employer.6  One of the challenges currently dividing the 
courts is determining who should come within the protection of 
the legislation.  The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Asadi v. 
GE Energy,7 interpreted the definition of “whistleblower” quite 
narrowly to encompass only those individuals who make 
information available directly to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC).  This interpretation by the Fifth Circuit not 
only rejects the broader interpretation of SEC regulations, but 
is also inconsistent with the decisions of various district courts 
that have considered this question.  Part I opens with a 
discussion of the requirements of “whistleblower” status under 
both the statutory language of Dodd-Frank and the 
accompanying SEC regulations.  Part II reviews the Asadi 
decision and calls into question the soundness of the court’s 
decision to disregard SEC regulations.  Part III explores the 
circumstances in which administrative regulations are entitled 
to deference and those situations in which they may be 
disregarded as an overreach of power.  Part IV surveys several 
district court decisions that have interpreted the term 
“whistleblower” under Dodd-Frank.  Part V argues that even 
public policy dictates that the courts should adopt a broad 
interpretation of “whistleblower” so as to provide maximum 
safeguards against fraud and abuse.  The paper concludes that 
the Fifth Circuit in Asadi reached an incorrect result, and, 
therefore, that this renegade decision which advocates a narrow 
scope of whistleblower protection should be rejected in future 
judicial interpretations of who is a whistleblower. 
 
II. Understanding the Protections of Dodd-Frank 
 
Dodd-Frank was enacted at a time of public disenchantment 
with American business due to illegal corporate activities and a 
lack of transparency.  The legislation established a 
whistleblower protection program, the origins of which can be 
traced back to financial regulatory reform proposed in 2009.8  
 
6. Id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A). 
7. See Asadi v. G. E. Energy (USA), LLC, 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2013). 
8. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Fact Sheet: 
Administration's Regulatory Reform Agenda Moves Forward; Legislation 
Strengthening Investor Protection Delivered to Capitol Hill (July 10, 2009), 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss3/3
  
2015 ASADI: RENEGADE OR PRECURSOR 889 
The goal of enhancing protection for whistleblowers was found 
to be significant to ushering in an era of financial reform. 
According to a Treasury Department press release, at the initial 
proposal for financial reform that ultimately led to Dodd-Frank, 
expanding SEC authority to incentivize whistleblowers was 
considered key as “[t]his authority will encourage insiders and 
others with strong evidence of securities law violations to bring 
that evidence to the SEC and improve its ability to enforce the 
securities laws.”9 
 
A. The Statutory Definition of Whistleblower Is Contradictory 
 
Section 922 of Dodd-Frank amended the Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934 by adding a new Section 21F entitled, 
“Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protection.”  This new 
legislation at subsection 6(a)(6) defines the term whistleblower 
as “any individual who provides, or 2 or more individuals acting 
jointly who provide, information relating to a violation of the 
securities laws to the [Securities and Exchange] Commission 
(SEC), in a manner established, by rule or regulation, by the 
Commission.”10  This statutory language indicates that to be 
considered a whistleblower under Dodd-Frank one must 
actually report information to the SEC. 
Another provision of Section 21F intended to strengthen 
protection for whistleblowers is the anti-retaliation provision of 
subsection 6(h)(1)(A) which provides that: 
 
No employer may discharge, demote, suspend, 
threaten, harass, directly or indirectly, or in any 
other manner discriminate against, a 
whistleblower in other terms and conditions of 
employment because of any lawful act done by the 
whistleblower- 
(i) in providing information to the Commission in 
accordance with this section; 
 
available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Pages/tg205.aspx. 
9. Id. 
10. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (emphasis added). 
3
  
890 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol. 35:3 
(ii) in initiating, testifying in, or assisting in any 
investigation or judicial or administrative action 
of the Commission based upon or related to such 
information; or 
(iii) in making disclosures that are required or 
protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 
[the Securities Exchange Act of 1934] . . . or any 
other law, rule, or regulation subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Commission.11 
 
While the definition found in subsection 6(a)(6) clearly 
requires reporting to the SEC as a prerequisite of whistleblower 
status, item (iii) of subsection 6(h)(1)(A) seemingly opens the 
possibility of other methods of reporting. 
 
By their own terms the first two anti-retaliation 
categories protect whistleblowers who report 
potentially illegal activity to the SEC or who work 
with the SEC directly, concerning potential 
securities violations.  By contrast, the third 
category does not require the whistleblower to 
have interacted directly with the SEC - only that 
the disclosure, to whomever made, was “required 
or protected” by certain laws within the SEC’s 
jurisdiction.12 
 
To reconcile these seemingly contradictory definitions we 
first look to administrative regulations. 
 
 
B. Administrative Regulations Broaden the Whistleblower 
Definition 
 
Section 924 of Dodd-Frank directed the SEC enact 
 
11. Id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A). 
12. Mark J. Oberti, Practical Applications in Employment Law: A New 
Wave of Employment Retaliation and Whistleblowing, 38 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 
43, 91-92 (2012). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss3/3
  
2015 ASADI: RENEGADE OR PRECURSOR 891 
regulations to implement the statute’s mandates.13 
The SEC regulation implementing the anti-retaliation 
provision of the statute provides: 
 
(1) For purposes of the anti-retaliation protections 
afforded by . . . 78u-6(h)(1), you are a 
whistleblower if: 
(i) You possess a reasonable belief that the 
information you are providing relates to a possible 
securities law violation . . . that has occurred, is 
ongoing, or is about to occur, and; 
(ii) You provide information in a manner 
described in Section 21F(h)(1)(A) . . .14 
 
Provision (ii) incorporates the anti-retaliation provisions of 
Section 806 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that provides protections 
for employees of public companies when the employees report 
information to (1) a federal regulatory or law enforcement 
agency, (ii) any member of Congress or a committee of Congress, 
or (iii) a person with supervisory authority over the employee or 
any other person working for the employer who has authority to 
investigate, discover, or terminate misconduct.  These reporting 
options apply to public companies and so offer no relief to 
employees of private companies.15 
This regulatory language allowing reporting to the 
employer’s internal reporting system rather than directly to the 
SEC seems at odds with the statutory language of Dodd-Frank’s 
whistleblower definition which includes only those reporting 
directly to the SEC.  In its explanation of the SEC’s seeming 
expansion of the “whistleblower” definition to encompass those 
who do not report directly to the SEC, the SEC acknowledged 
that “[a] significant issue discussed in the Proposing Release [of 
the regulations] was the impact of the whistleblower program on 
companies’ internal compliance processes.”16  The regulations 
 
13. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-7. 
14. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(b)(1) (2015). 
15. See Chelsea Hunt Overhuls, Unfinished Business: Dodd-Frank's 
Whistleblower Anti-Retaliation Protections Fall Short For Private Companies 
and Their Employers, 6 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 1 (2012). 
16. Implementation of the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the 
5
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included proposals to encourage potential whistleblowers to 
utilize internal compliance.17 
According to the SEC’s Office of the Whistleblower, “The 
whistleblower program was designed to complement, rather 
than replace, existing corporate compliance programs.  While it 
provides incentives for insiders and others with information 
about unlawful conduct to come forward, it also encourages them 
to work within their company’s own compliance structure.”18  In 
the 2013 Asadi case, the Fifth Circuit rejected the SEC’s broad 
interpretation of the statute, considering the SEC’s regulations 
at odds with congressional intent. Let us now turn to a 
discussion of that case. 
 
III. Asadi Rejects the SEC Statutory Interpretation 
 
Khaled Asadi, a dual United States and Iraqi citizen, was 
employed by G.E. Energy in 2006 as the company’s Iraq County 
Executive, a job which required him to relocate to Jordan.  In 
2010, G.E. was negotiating a joint venture agreement with the 
Iraq Minister of Electricity.  It was brought to Asadi’s attention 
by someone in the Iraqi government that G.E. might have hired 
a woman close to the Senior Deputy Minister of Electricity “in 
order to curry favor with the Minister while negotiating a 
lucrative Joint Venture Agreement.”19  According to Asadi, the 
Deputy Minister specifically requested that she be hired. 
Asadi, concerned that this action would be a violation of the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA),20 reported this to his 
supervisor and also to the G.E. Energy ombudsperson for that 
 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, SEC Release No. 34-64545, 17 C.F.R. Parts 
240 & 249 (2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2011/34-
64545.pdf. 
17. For example, the regulations provide that a whistleblower's voluntary 
participation in an entity's internal compliance and reporting systems is a 
factor that can increase the amount of any bounty award. 
18. SEC OFFICE OF THE WHISTLEBLOWER, ANN. REP. TO CONG. ON THE 
DODD-FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM (2013), available at 
https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/annual-report-2013.pdf. 
19. See Am. Compl., Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), LLC, 720 F.3d 620 (5th 
Cir. 2013) (No. 12-20522). 
20. The FCPA generally forbids individuals or companies from 
endeavoring to influence foreign officials by offering, promising, or giving them 
anything of value. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2012). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss3/3
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region.  Shortly after Asadi expressed his concerns about these 
activities, he received a negative performance review and was 
pressured by his employer to step down from his position and 
accept a role in the company with minimal responsibility.  When 
he did not do so, the following year he was fired. 
Asadi brought a claim against his employer alleging, in part, 
that his termination following his reporting of a possible FCPA 
violation was impermissible under the Dodd-Frank 
whistleblower protection provision.  At issue in the case was 
whether Asadi was within the protection of that statute. 
Conceding that he did not come within the literal definition 
of a whistleblower since he did not provide information to the 
SEC, Asadi asserted that he was still within the scope of Dodd-
Frank based on that law’s description of protection for 
whistleblowers.  Asadi asked the court to read the provisions of 
78u-6(h)(1)(A) as creating additional avenues of whistleblower 
protection, specifically that since subparagraph (iii) does not 
require disclosures be made to the SEC it provides protection 
even for those individuals who do not fall within the literal 
definition of a whistleblower. 
In considering Asadi’s claim, the Fifth Circuit analyzed the 
interplay between subsections (6)(a) and (6)(h) as illustrated in 
Part I.  Subsection (a) contains definitions for terms used 
throughout the statute.  “That definition [of whistleblower] 
standing alone, expressly and unambiguously requires that an 
individual provide information to the SEC to qualify as a 
‘whistleblower’ for purposes of §78u-6.”21 Considering the 
interpretation of legal texts, the court relied on the following, 
“When a . . .definitional section says a word ‘means’ something, 
the clear import is that this is its only meaning.”22 
Ultimately, the Appeals Court disagreed with Asadi, 
rejecting the notion that subparagraph (iii) defines who can 
qualify as a whistleblower, and instead relied on the plain 
language of the statute that there is only one category of 
whistleblower – the one who provides information to the SEC.  
The court interpreted subsection (iii) rather narrowly as simply 
 
21. Asadi, 720 F.3d at 623. 
22. Id. (citing ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN GARNER, READING LAW: THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 226 (1st ed. 2012)). 
7
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defining categories of protected activities in which a 
whistleblower may engage.  As a result, the court concluded 
there was no conflict between the definition of whistleblower and 
the third category of protected activity.  Relying on Chevron,23 
the court rejected the SEC’s expansive interpretation of the term 
whistleblower, stating, “[i]f the intent of Congress is clear, that 
is the end of the matter; for the court as well as the agency, must 
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”24  
As will be explained in Part IV, the Asadi court was incorrect in 
its refusal to recognize the SEC regulations. 
 
IV. The Authority of an Administrative Agency to Broaden a 
Statutory Mandate Should be Upheld 
 
An administrative agency is free to interpret the 
construction of a statute created by Congress which was meant 
to guide an agency in implementing Congress’s will in any given 
area of law.  The U.S. Constitution’s Article I, §1 states, “All 
legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress 
of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House 
of Representatives.”25  The text is specific in that all legislative 
powers are vested in Congress and the Supreme Court has ruled 
that, “This text permits no delegation of those powers”.26 
 
A. Powers of Administrative Agencies 
 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines legislative power as, 
 
The power to make laws and to alter them; a 
legislative body’s exclusive authority to make, 
amend, and repeal laws.  Under federal law, this 
power is vested in Congress, consisting of the 
House of Representatives and the Senate.  A 
legislative body may delegate a portion of its 
 
23. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837 (1984). 
24. Id. at 842-44. 
25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
26. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (citing 
Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 771 (1996)). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss3/3
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lawmaking authority to agencies within the 
executive branch for purposes of rule making and 
regulation.  But a legislative body may not 
delegate its authority to the judicial branch, and 
the judicial branch may not encroach on 
legislative duties.27 
 
One should note that in that definition, a distinction is made 
between the law and a rule.  A rule is defined as, “an established 
and authoritative standard or principle[.]”28  So, if in fact 
Congress is the only one who may make laws, why is it then that 
an allowance is made for the creation of rules by means of a 
delegation to agencies of a rule-making function?  According to 
the Supreme Court, “This Court [U.S. Supreme Court] 
established long ago that Congress must be permitted to 
delegate to others at least some authority that it could exercise 
itself.”29 
The fundamental precept of the delegation doctrine fits well 
within the Framer’s design of a workable National Government, 
in that though the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power 
to make laws, it does not prohibit a transfer of some of that 
authority to another branch, thus freeing Congress to address 
itself to more pressing legislative concerns.30 
Therefore the delegation of rulemaking authority from 
Congress to agencies is seen as a beneficial necessity for the 
creation of a workable national government.  There has also 
been a realization that certain issues may pose a complexity 
which Congress may be ill-suited to handle in the specific.31 
 
The reach of the Federal Government’s 
enumerated powers is broader still because the 
 
27. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 919 (8th ed. 2004).  
28. Id. at 1357. 
29. Loving, 517 U.S. at 758 (1996) (citing Wayman v. Southard, 6 L. Ed. 
253 (1825)). 
30. Id. at 771. 
31. See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 
495, 529-30 (1935) (recognizing "the necessity of adapting legislation to 
complex conditions involving a host of details with which the national 
legislature cannot deal directly"). 
9
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Constitution authorizes Congress to “make all 
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for 
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers.” 
Art. I, § 8, cl. 18. We have long read this provision 
to give Congress great latitude in exercising its 
powers: “Let the end be legitimate, let it be within 
the scope of the constitution, and all means which 
are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that 
end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the 
letter and spirit of the constitution, are 
constitutional.”32 
 
So given that a delegation of some of Congress’s authority is 
allowed, if not required, we next address the question of what is 
the appropriate percentage, scope and/or degree of that 
delegation?  This question was not lost on one of our founding 
fathers, Thomas Jefferson, who said “Nothing is so 
embarrassing nor so mischievous in a great assembly as the 
details of execution.”33  And it is to those details of execution that 
we now turn our attention. 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly allowed a conferring of 
decision-making authority upon agencies,34 Congress must “lay 
down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the 
person or body authorized to [act] is directed to conform.”35 The 
purpose thereby is to provide a guide for the agencies’ exercise 
of authority.36  The Court has also recognized the expertise of 
administrative agencies.  The U.S. Supreme Court in City of 
Milwaukee v. Illinois, in discussing the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act Amendments of 1972, said that the Act was being 
“supervised by an expert administrative agency,”37 thus 
confirming the EPA’s position as both an expert and as a 
 
32. Nat’l Fed’n of Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2579 (2012) (citing 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819)). 
33. 5 THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 319 (Paul 
L. Ford ed., 1904) (letter to E. Carrington, (Aug. 4, 1787)). 
34. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns., 531 U.S. 457, 457 (2001). 
35. Id. at 472 (citing J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 
394, 409 (1928)). 
36. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 463 (citing Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. 
EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). 
37. Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 305 (1981). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss3/3
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supervisor. 
Administrative agencies were created to be specialists in 
given areas of the law, taking on the role of a supervisor, who 
presumably, is guided by a set of instructions which Congress 
would promulgate.  There is an inherent problem in this 
dynamic, in that the agency is being guided by someone, who is 
not an expert in the field to be regulated.  How can Congress 
appropriately set the boundaries for the agency to operate 
within, when they lack the technical knowledge of 
understanding the scope of the problem to be dealt with?  Many 
times the extent of the problem, its subtleties, or its facets are 
not even known until extensive factual material is analyzed and 
evaluated by the agency experts.  How can Congress set limits 
on the agency action when Congress at the time of their 
promulgation of an enabling statute does not understand the 
exacting particulars of what is to be done? 
The answer lies in the fact that the courts have taken the 
position that it shall be sufficient for the purposes for delegation 
of authority that Congress sets out the legislative policy for the 
agency to follow, while leaving the details of specific 
implementation to the agency.  It also appears that the degree 
of freedom delegated to the agency is for Congress to decide.  The 
Supreme Court has “almost never felt qualified to second-guess 
Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment 
that can be left to those executing or applying the law.”38  
Therefore, it appears that the amount of freedom, or lack 
thereof, granted to the agency, will be determined by Congress’ 
judgment and “the degree of agency discretion that is acceptable 
varies according to the scope of the power congressionally 
conferred.”39 
Yet how should we discern the scope of Congressional intent 
in that delegation of authority?  Should we look to words alone?  
Should we look to the overall tenor of the statute and its gleaned 
general intent or should we look only to what Congress 
specifically said?  The answer has been fairly consistent for the 
last 100 years, beginning with Justice Holmes understanding 
that, “[w]e do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask 
 
38. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989). 
39. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 475 (citing Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 
748, 748 (1996)). 
11
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only what the statute means.”40 
In 1984, the Supreme Court in the landmark decision of 
Chevron USA v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 
outlined in a fairly concise fashion what the court will be looking 
for when it is reviewing agency action and/or interpretation 
pursuant to that agency’s enabling statute. 
 
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of 
the statute which it administers, it is confronted 
with two questions. First, always, is the question 
whether Congress has directly spoken to the 
precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress 
is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, 
as well as the agency, must give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, 
however, the court determines Congress has not 
directly addressed the precise question at issue, 
the court does not simply impose its own 
construction on the statute, as would be necessary 
in the absence of an administrative 
interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or 
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the 
question for the court is whether the agency’s 
answer is based on a permissible construction of 
the statute.41 
 
Therefore based on Chevron, the freedom of agency action 
and interpretation is based on the clarity of the intent of 
Congress, as demonstrated in the language of the statute.  “If 
the intent of Congress is clear . . . the agency must give effect to 
that unambiguous language.”42  That does raise the question of 
whether the language chosen is “clear.”  Is it possible for a word 
which is chosen by Congress to be both singular in its denotative 
definition as well as chosen for its connotative definition?  The 
Supreme Court has made clear that, when context permits, the 
 
40. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. 
L. REV. 417, 419 (1899). 
41. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
843 (1984). 
42. Id. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss3/3
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agency is allowed to use its expertise in deciding the extent of a 
definition.43 
When the words chosen have definitions which lead to a 
general interpretation the agency is allowed to interject its 
expertise.   But when the word chosen is one where there is little 
doubt as to its meaning and extent, the agency’s actions are 
limited.  “[I]t is for agencies, not courts, to fill statutory gaps. 
The fact that a statute is unambiguous means that there is no 
gap for the agency to fill and thus no room for agency 
discretion.”44 
 
B. The Scope of Agency Freedom 
 
If the Congressional intent is silent or ambiguous what may 
the agency do?  Again Chevron and its subsequent 
interpretations give us the answer.  In 2005 the Supreme Court 
in Brand X stated thusly: “If statute is ambiguous, and 
implementing agency’s construction is reasonable, Chevron 
requires federal courts to accept agency’s construction of statute, 
even if agency’s reading differs from what court believes is best 
statutory interpretation.”45 
Lest we forget, the court does want to make it clear that, 
“The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory 
construction and must reject administrative constructions which 
are contrary to clear congressional intent.”46 
 
43. In Whitman, the Court held that while Congress did not have to 
provide direction to the EPA concerning how it defined “country elevators” that 
were to be exempt from new stationary-source regulations governing grain 
elevators, it did have to furnish substantial guidance on setting air standards 
that affected the entire national economy. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 475. Similarly, 
the Court ruled that a congressional statute was not required to “decree how 
‘imminent’ was too imminent, or how ‘necessary’ was necessary enough, or … 
how ‘hazardous’ was too hazardous’” (citing Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 
160, 165-67 (1991), nor must a statute authorizing agencies to recoup “excess 
profits” paid under wartime Government contracts define how much profit was 
too much (citing Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 783-86 (1948). Id. at 
475. 
44. United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1843 
(2012) (internal quotations marks and citation omitted). 
45. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 
967, 969 (2005). 
46. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837 n.9. 
13
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In 2001 in United States v. Mead Corp., the court found that 
if agency power was not delegated then it was for the court to 
decide the statutory interpretation.47  “When an agency 
exercises delegated lawmaking power, the court must accept the 
agency’s reasonable interpretation of the statute. When an 
agency is not exercising delegated lawmaking power, the court 
interprets the statute giving appropriate deference, under the 
circumstances, to the agency’s interpretation, but deciding for 
itself the meaning of the statute.”48 
Therefore, agency freedom is a direct consequence of the 
specificity of the statutory language.  The more generalized the 
language, the more the courts are willing to allow the agency 
freedom in the use of its expertise.  The more restrictive the 
language, the less the courts are willing to allow forays into 
uncharted waters.  Less clear is the outcome when the general 
tenor of a statute is pointing in a general direction.  Will the 
court allow the agency to move into that area? 
Turning our attention back to the proper interpretation of a 
“whistleblower” under Dodd-Frank, the question remains how to 
properly interpret the interplay between subsections (a) and (h). 
The ambiguity created when these two subsections are viewed 
together opens the door to the administrative interpretation 
which should have been respected by the Fifth Circuit.  In an 
Amicus Curiae brief filed on February 20, 2014 in support of Liu 
Meng-Lin, the appellant in a Second Circuit case, the SEC 
states, “The examination of the relevant statutory language 
demonstrates, at a minimum, considerable tension and 
inconsistency within the text, thus revealing that Congress did 
not unambiguously express an intent to limit the employment 
anti-retaliation protections under Section 21F(h)(1) only to those 
individuals who report securities law violations to the 
Commission.”49 
 
47. Michael P. Healy, Reconciling Chevron, Mead and the Review of 
Agency Discretion: Source of Law and the Standards of Judicial Review, 19 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 21 (2011) (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 
218, 238 (2001)). 
48. Id. 
49. Brief of the SEC, Amicus Curiae in Support of the Appellant, Meng-
Lin v. Siemens, A.G., No. 13 Civ. 317, 2013 WL 5692504, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 
21, 2013) (No. 13-4385). For additional discussion of this brief, see Mystica M. 
Alexander, Defining the Whistleblower Under Dodd Frank: Who Decides? 5 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss3/3
  
2015 ASADI: RENEGADE OR PRECURSOR 901 
As will be illustrated in Part V, various district courts that 
have commented on the difficult task of reconciling these two 
apparently inconsistent positions have also overwhelmingly 
agreed the provisions taken together are either “conflicting” or 
“ambiguous,” and, therefore, should be applied with the broad 
interpretation provided in the SEC regulations. 
 
V. District Court Interpretations of Whistleblower Protection 
 
Various district courts have been asked to interpret the 
whistleblowing and reporting requirements of Dodd-Frank. The 
Asadi court, while recognizing that several district courts have 
ruled in favor of an expansive interpretation of the term 
whistleblower, opted not to follow that line of reasoning.  The 
two opinions of Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc. involved a financial 
software business that provided software to conduct trades on 
the Internet.50  Nollner v. Southern Baptist Convention, Inc.,51 
concerned allegations of bribery under the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act.52  Lastly, Kramer v. Trans-Lux Corp53 dealt with 
alleged violations of the defendant company’s pension plan.54 
Although each of the cases dealt with distinct fact patterns and 
differing outcomes for the whistleblowers, one common thread 
between them (and several other district court decisions 
considering similar issues)55 is the acknowledgement that to 
 
CAL. L. REV. CIRCUIT 278 (2014).  In its August 2014 resolution of this case, the 
Second Circuit failed to address this issue and decided the case on other 
grounds. 
50. Egan v. TradingScreen Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8202 (LBS), 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 103416, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2011); Egan v. TradingScreen Inc., 
No. 10 Civ. 8202 (LBS), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47713, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 
2011). 
51. See Nollner v. S. Baptist Convention, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 986 (M.D. 
Tenn. 2012). 
52. Id. at 990. See also 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2012). 
53. See Kramer v. Trans-Lux Corp., No. 3:11cv1424 (SRU), 2012 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 136939, at *1 (D. Conn. Sept. 25, 2012). 
54. Id. at *1. 
55. Other district courts in agreement with the SEC’s expansive 
interpretation include: Connolly v. Remkes, No. 5: 14-cv-03144, 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 153439 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2014); Yang v. Navigators Grp., Inc., 18 F. 
Supp 3d. 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Khazin v. TD Ameritrade Holding Corp., No. 13-
4149, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31142 (D.N.J. Mar. 11, 2014), aff'd on other 
grounds, 773 F.3d 488 (3d Cir. 2014); Genberg v. Porter, 935 F. Supp. 2d 1094 
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come within the whistleblower protection of Dodd-Frank an 
individual need not report directly to the SEC, but rather, in 
certain circumstances, indirect reporting, such as through 
company internal reporting is sufficient.  We will review each of 
these cases in turn.  We will then turn our attention to two post-
Asadi district court cases.  In Englehart v. Career Education 
Corporation,56  the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of 
Florida followed the decision of the Asadi court.  Less than two 
weeks after the Englehart decision, the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Nebraska in Bussing v. COR Clearing LLC57 
rejected the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit. 
 
A. Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc. 
 
TradingScreen is a financial software business that 
provides hedge funds, asset managers, private bankers, and 
high net-worth individuals with software that helps them 
conduct trades on the Internet. Defendant, TradingScreen 
Brokerage Services, LLC (“TSBS”), is a broker-dealer affiliated 
with TradingScreen, Inc. and Philippe Buhannic is Chief 
Executive Officer of both TradingScreen, Inc. and TSBS.58 
Patrick Egan, the plaintiff, began working for 
TradingScreen in 2003.  In early 2009, he learned Buhannic, the 
CEO of Defendant, was diverting TradingScreen’s corporate 
assets to another company that he solely owned, SpreadZero, 
which offered products and services similar to those of 
TradingScreen.  In particular, Egan alleged that Buhannic was 
using TradingScreen employees to do unpaid work for 
SpreadZero, cannibalizing TradingScreen’s customer lists, and 
invoicing SpreadZero at below-market rates for various services.  
By late 2009, Plaintiff concluded that Buhannic’s behavior was 
costing TradingScreen hundreds of thousands of dollars and 
 
(D. Colo. 2013); Ellington v. Giacoumakis, 977 F. Supp. 2d 42 (D. Mass. 2013); 
Rosenblum v. Thomson Reuters (Mkts.), LLC, 984 F. Supp. 2d 141 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013); Murray v. UBS Secs., LLC, No. 12 Civ. 5914 (JMF), 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 71945, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2013). 
56. See Englehart v. Career Educ. Corp., No. 8:14-cv-444-T-33EAJ, 2014 
WL 2619501, at *1 (M.D. Fla. May 12, 2014). 
57. See Bussing v. COR Clearing, LLC, 20 F. Supp. 3d 719 (D. Neb. 2014). 
58. Egan v. TradingScreen Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8202 (LBS), 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 103416, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2011). 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss3/3
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posing a threat to the existence of TradingScreen’s business.59 
In early 2010, Plaintiff reported Buhannic’s behavior to the 
President of TradingScreen, Michael Chin, who passed the 
information to those members of TradingScreen’s Board of 
Directors who were not controlled by Buhannic (the 
“Independent Directors”). The Independent Directors hired the 
law firm of Latham & Watkins LLP (“Latham”) to conduct an 
internal investigation.  Latham issued a report confirming 
Plaintiff’s allegations.  As a result, the Independent Directors 
informed Buhannic that he would have to resign, but he gained 
control of the Board and thereby prevented them from forcing 
his resignation.  Buhannic then fired Chin and Plaintiff without 
informing the Board.60 
Egan claimed relief under the Securities Whistleblower 
Incentives and Protection provisions of Dodd-Frank, specifically 
the portion of the statute that allows a private cause of action 
for whistleblowers alleging retaliatory discharge or other 
discrimination.61  He argued that he could bring an action 
against Buhannic and TradingScreen under these anti-
retaliation provisions.62  However, Defendants contended that 
these provisions did not cover Egan because he never personally 
contacted the SEC to report Buhannic’s conduct.63  The court 
found that Egan’s claim raised three questions: (1) whether any 
disclosure to the SEC is required as a predicate to an action 
under the whistleblower anti-retaliation provisions of  Dodd-
Frank; (2) if such disclosure is required, whether the party 
invoking the Act must have personally and directly reported to 
the SEC; and (3) whether Egan had adequately alleged that the 
information he provided to attorneys retained by the 
Independent Directors was ultimately reported to the SEC.64 
Since he did not report information to the SEC, he attempted to 
show that his disclosures fell under the categories of disclosures 
 
59. Id. at *4-5. 
60. Id. at *5-6. 
61. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(i)). Relief includes reinstatement, 
double the back pay owed, costs and fees.  Id. (citing 15 U.S.C § 78u-6(h)(1)(C)). 
62. Egan v. TradingScreen Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8202 (LBS), 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 47713, at *8-*9 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011). 
63. Id. at *9. 
64. Id. 
17
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delineated by 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) that do not require 
such reporting: those under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the 
Securities Exchange Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e), or other laws and 
regulations subject to the jurisdiction of the SEC.65  He could not 
come under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act because its whistleblower 
provisions apply only to publicly-traded companies and 
TradingScreen was a privately held company.66  Egan also 
argued that he disclosed Buhannic’s violations of rules 
promulgated by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority 
(“FINRA”), and that these disclosures fell under Dodd-Frank’s 
protection of disclosures “subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Commission.”67  The court rejected this argument because Dodd-
Frank protects whistleblowers who fulfill an existing duty to 
disclose, but it does not protect those who report violations of 
SEC laws or regulations that do not impose such a duty. 
Furthermore, the FINRA rules Egan cited do not impose a duty 
to disclose.68  Finally, he claimed that his disclosures were 
protected by section 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii)’s incorporation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1513(e), which prohibits “interference with the lawful 
employment or livelihood of any person” who provides truthful 
information “to a law enforcement officer” relating to the 
commission of federal offenses.69   But the court held that he did 
not allege that he or anyone acting jointly with him reported 
Buhannic’s conduct to a law enforcement or government 
authority other than the SEC.  Therefore, it concluded, a claim 
of whistleblowing under section 1513(e) still relied on the 
question of whether Egan or anyone acting jointly with him did 
in fact report to the SEC.70  Nevertheless, because he raised 
factual allegations that supported his original pleading “on 
information and belief” that his information concerning 
Buhannic’s conduct was reported to the SEC, the court granted 
him leave to amend his complaint.71  The court intended that his 
amended complaint would plead facts supporting his knowledge, 
 
65. Id. at *14. 
66. Id. 
67. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii). 
68. Egan v. TradingScreen Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8202 (LBS), 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 47713, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011). 
69. Id. at *18-19. 
70. Id. at *19. 
71. Id. at *30. 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss3/3
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heretofore on “information and belief,” that Buhannic’s conduct 
was reported to the SEC. It stated that such amendment would 
be effective only if it supported knowledge of actual transmission 
to the SEC.72  Nonetheless, the court found that his amended 
complaint failed to state a claim under Dodd-Frank’s 
whistleblower protection provisions because the law firm to 
whom Buhannic’s conduct was reported did not report his 
actions to the SEC.73  Consequently the court dismissed his 
Dodd-Frank claim,74 while acknowledging that “a literal reading 
of the definition of the term ‘whistleblower’ in 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
6(a)(6), requiring reporting to the SEC, would effectively 
invalidate § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii)’s protection of whistleblower 
disclosures that do not require reporting to the SEC.”75 
 
B. Nollner v. Southern Baptist Convention, Inc. 
 
Ron Nollner and his wife Beverly were Tennessee residents. 
He had many years of experience in the construction industry 
and was a devoted member of the Southern Baptist community. 
Around April 2008, he responded to an International Mission 
Board of the Southern Baptist Convention, Inc, (IMB)76 job 
posting to perform missionary-related work on the church’s 
behalf in New Delhi, India.  The posting solicited candidates to 
manage construction of a new office building in New Delhi, 
including working with local companies, assisting in obtaining 
necessary permits, and ensuring that engineering standards 
were followed.  It also indicated that the term of employment 
would be a minimum of 24 months and a maximum of 36 
months.  Furthermore, it included a “Spouse Assignment 
Description,” which stated that the candidate’s spouse would “be 
a vital part of the team,” reflecting an intent to hire both the 
 
72. Id. 
73. Egan v. TradingScreen Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8202 (LBS), 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 103416, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2011); 
74. Id. at *14. 
75. Egan v. TradingScreen Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8202 (LBS), 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 47713, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011). 
76. IMB is a wholly owned subsidiary of the Southern Baptist Convention. 
Nollner v. S. Baptist Convention, Inc., 852 F.Supp. 2d 986, 989 (M.D. Tenn. 
2012). 
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construction manager and his or her spouse.77 
IMB encouraged the Nollners to take the positions 
identified in the Job Vacancy Announcement.  In October 2008, 
at IMB’s urging, the Nollners accepted the positions, which they 
understood would last at least one 36-month term.  In 
anticipation of moving to New Delhi for this extended period, the 
Nollners sold essentially all of their assets.  Mr. Nollner gave up 
his active construction career and his wife quit her job.78 
When they arrived in New Delhi, the situation was not what 
had been promised. The planning and permitting phase of the 
project had already been completed and the defendants would 
not allow Mr. Nollner to meet with the architect or contractor for 
the job at issue until April 2009, well into the project.  Over the 
next several months, Mr. Nollner also became aware of much 
disturbing information, including the contractor and architect 
paying bribes to local Indian officials with money IMB furnished 
as well as their attempting to bribe him.79  He reported these 
practices and potential illegalities to his supervisors multiple 
times, but they ignored his entreaties.80  When he reported his 
grave concerns about potential bribery to the defendants’ 
employees, they “seemed unbothered, if not complicit.”81  In 
October 2010, his superiors asked him to resign.  After he 
refused, he was terminated, his superiors claiming his position 
was no longer necessary.  When the Nollners returned to the 
U.S, they instituted suit in Tennessee state court, which 
defendants later removed to federal district court.82 
The court cited Dodd-Frank’s definition of a “whistleblower” 
as “any individual who provides, or 2 or more individuals acting 
jointly who provide, information relating to a violation of the 
 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. at 990. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. The original complaint asserted claims for breach of contract, 
promissory estoppel, and retaliatory discharge under Tennessee common law 
and the Tennessee Public Protection Act. When they added a claim under 
Dodd-Frank, the defendants removed the case to federal district court on the 
grounds that the court had original federal question jurisdiction over the Dodd-
Frank claim and supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. Id. at 
988. 
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securities laws to the Commission [i.e., the SEC], in a manner 
established, by rule or regulation, by the Commission.” 83 It 
reviewed the anti-retaliation provision of the Act most relevant 
to the Nollners, to wit: 
 
(iii) in making disclosures that are required or 
protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
(15 U.S.C. 7201 et seq.), the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.), including 
section 10A(m) of such Act (15 U.S.C. 78f(m)), 
section 1513(e) of Title 18, and any other law, rule, 
or regulation subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Commission.84 
 
Addressing the scope of this provision, the court noted that 
its protections extend only to any “law, rule, or regulation subject 
to the jurisdiction of the Commission,” so that where an 
employee reports a violation of a federal law by the employer, 
Dodd-Frank only protects that employee against retaliation if 
the federal violation falls within the SEC’s jurisdiction.85  Thus, 
the court stated, a plaintiff seeking relief under this provision 
must demonstrate that the disclosure at issue relates to a 
violation of federal securities laws, and that it is  “required or 
protected” by laws, rules, or regulations within the SEC’s 
jurisdiction.86  Consequently, an employee is not protected from 
retaliation if the disclosure at issue is not “required” or 
otherwise “protected” by a law, rule, or regulation within the 
SEC’s jurisdiction.87  The Nollners argued that their employer 
violated the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act88 by bribing foreign 
officials and it retaliated against them for reporting those 
violations internally.89  The court noted that the FCPA provides 
both criminal and civil enforcement mechanisms, with the 
 
83. Id. at 992-93 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6)). 
84. Id. at 993 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)). 
85. Id. at 994. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
88. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, et.seq. 
89. Nollner v. S. Baptist Conventon, Inc., 852 F.Supp. 2d 986, 995-96 
(M.D. Tenn. 2012). 
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Department of Justice (DOJ) solely responsible for all FCPA 
criminal enforcement and the SEC in charge of enforcement for 
FCPA violations by issuers.90  Because the defendants were not 
“issuers” and had not committed any securities violations, the 
SEC had no jurisdiction over them, the court decided, and so it 
refused to interpret Dodd-Frank as extending its whistleblower 
protections to companies that otherwise have no relationship to 
the SEC and have not committed securities violations.91  As 
result, it dismissed the Nollners’ Dodd-Frank claim with 
prejudice.92  Although the Nollners did not qualify for 
whistleblower protection in the circumstances of this case, 
significant for our purposes is the court’s acknowledgement that 
Egan correctly determined that whistleblower protection could 
be extended more broadly to those who do not provide 
disclosures directly to the SEC but rather indirectly notify the 
SEC through initiating reporting through internal company 
reporting channels. 
 
C. Kramer v. Trans-Lux Corp. 
 
Richard Kramer began working for the Trans-Lux 
Corporation in 1981, and for the past eighteen years had served 
as its Vice President of Human Resources and Administration, 
responsible for managing its relationship with the Pension 
Benefits Guaranty Corporation’s (PBGC) oversight of the Trans-
Lux ERISA governed pension plan, ensuring company 
compliance with all federal and state laws and regulations and 
serving as plan sponsor/administrator on all benefit plans as 
well as serving as fiduciary for its Defined Benefit and Defined 
Contributions plans.  His supervisor was Angela Toppi, Trans-
Lux’s Chief Financial Officer, and Jean Marc Allain, its Chief 
Executive Officer.93 
Kramer and Toppi both served as members of the company’s 
pension plan committee.  Although the pension plan required 
the committee to have at least three members, since 2009 the 
 
90. Id. at 996 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(d)). 
91. Id. at 997. 
92. Id. at 997-98. 
93. Kramer v. Trans-Lux Corp., No. 3:11CV1424(SRU), 2012 WL 
4444820, at *2 (D. Conn. Sept. 25, 2012). 
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committee had only two members.  Kramer repeatedly advised 
Toppi that the committee needed at least one additional 
member, but she rejected his advice.94 
Not only did Toppi serve on the pension plan committee, but 
she also was the sole trustee of Trans-Lux’s pension plan. 
Kramer believed that her position as a trustee created a conflict 
of interest, and reported his concerns to the company.  
Specifically, Kramer was concerned that Toppi had inside 
knowledge of Trans-Lux’s financial situation, and continued to 
hold company bonds as a pension investment, even as they lost 
nearly all of their value.  Again, his concerns were rejected.95 
In December 2008, March 2009, September 2010, and 
January 2011, Trans-Lux amended its pension plan.  The plan 
required amendments to be made pursuant to the 
recommendation of a three-person committee, but the 2010 and 
2011 amendments were instead made at the recommendation of 
a two-person committee.  Toppi was also required to bring the 
2009 amendments to the board of directors for approval.  She 
failed to do so, and also neglected to file the 2009 amendments 
with the SEC.96 
In March 2011, Toppi ordered Kramer not to file a Form 10 
with the PBGC.  The form would have notified the PBGC that 
there had been a missed contribution, and would have subjected 
Trans-Lux to an immediate penalty.97 
Kramer continued to express his concerns to Toppi and 
Allain but again they were dismissed.  In May 2011, he contacted 
Trans-Lux’s board of directors’ audit committee about his 
concerns.  Shortly thereafter, he sent a letter to the SEC about 
Trans-Lux’s failure to submit the 2009 amendment to the board 
of directors or the SEC.98  In July 2011, Kramer was fired,99 and 
subsequently brought suit under Dodd-Frank.100 
 
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. 
99. Kramer v. Trans-Lux Corp., No. 3:11CV1424(SRU), 2012 WL 
4444820, at *2 (D. Conn. Sept. 25, 2012). 
100. Id. at *1. He also bought a claim under the Employment Retirement 
Income Security Act ("ERISA"). Id. at *3. 
23
  
910 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol. 35:3 
The court first wrestled with the definition of 
“whistleblower” under Dodd-Frank and the anti-retaliation 
sections, holding that it is broader with respect to the anti-
retaliation section than it is for the rest of the Act.101  It next 
reviewed the SEC’s rule that states for the purposes of the 
retaliation protections afforded by Section 21F(h)(1) of the 
Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 78u-6(h)(1)), you are a whistleblower if: 
 
(i) You possess a reasonable belief that the 
information you are providing relates to a possible 
securities law violation (or, where applicable, to a 
possible violation of the provisions set forth in 18 
U.S.C. 1514A(a)) that has occurred, is ongoing, or 
is about to occur, and; 
(ii) You provide that information in a manner 
described in Section 21F(h)(1)(A) of the Exchange 
Act (15 U.S.C. 78u-6(h)(1)(A)).102 
 
The court next rejected Trans-Lux’s argument that Kramer 
was not engaging in protected activity when he sent a letter to 
the SEC, because he did not do so in a manner established by 
the SEC, holding that Section 78u-6(a)(6)’s requirement that the 
information at hand have been provided “in a manner 
established, by rule or regulation, to the Commission” does not 
apply to section 78u-6(h)(1)(A).  Instead, the court reasoned, 
someone must only allege that they possessed a “reasonable 
belief that the information” provided “relates to a possible 
securities law violation,” and that the information was provided 
in a manner described in section 78u-6(h)(1)(A).103  The court 
found that Kramer’s disclosures were related to violations of the 
securities laws and that disclosures protected under Sarbanes-
Oxley’s whistleblower provision are also protected under Dodd-
Frank’s whistleblower provision.  Sarbanes-Oxley protects 
persons who disclose information they reasonably believe 
 
101. Id. at *11 (citing Nollner v. S. Baptist Convention, Inc., 852 F.Supp. 
2d 986, 989 (M.D.T.N. 2012); Egan v. TradingScreen Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8202 
(LBS), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47713, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011)). 
102. See Kramer, 2012 WL 4444820, at *4 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-
2(b)(1) (2015)). 
103. Id. at *5 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(b)). 
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constitutes a violation of SEC rules or regulations, when the 
information is provided to, among others, “a person with 
supervisory authority over the employee (or such other person 
working for the employer who has the authority to investigate, 
discover, or terminate misconduct).”104  Kramer alleged that 
Allain had supervisory authority over him, and that the Trans-
Lux audit committee may have had the authority to investigate, 
discover, or terminate misconduct.  The court found that 
Kramer’s emails and letter where he raised his concerns 
demonstrated that he may have reasonably believed Trans-Lux 
to be committing violations of SEC rules or regulations.105 
Therefore, the court ruled that he alleged sufficient facts to 
support a Dodd-Frank whistleblower claim based on his internal 
and external communications, and consequently denied Trans-
Lux’s motion to dismiss his Dodd-Frank claim.106 
 
D. Englehart v. Career Education Corporation 
 
Diana Englehart was employed as the Director of Career 
Services at the Sanford Brown Institute, one of over ninety 
schools run by her employer, Career Education Corporation 
(“CEC”).  As part of her responsibilities, Ms. Englehart was 
responsible for preparing budgets and financial forecasts which 
would then be made available to both shareholders and the 
public.107  When Ms. Englehart noticed what she considered 
“material misrepresentations” in the budgets and forecasts that 
had been prepared by the Institute she relayed her concerns to 
the Vice President of Operations at the Institute in November, 
2010.108  Englehart believed that the misrepresentations, which 
overstated both placement and enrollment numbers, were a 
violation of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.109  Shortly 
after expressing her objections, Englehart was placed on paid 
leave.  While on leave, she was fired.  Englehart alleged this 
 
104. Id. at *17 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)(C)). 
105. Id. at *17-18. 
106. Id. at *18-19. 
107. See Englehart v. Career Educ. Corp., No. 8:14-CV-444-T-33EAJ, 
2014 WL 2619501, at *1 (M.D. Fla. May 12, 2014). 
108. Id. at *2-*3. 
109. Id. at *3. 
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firing was done in retaliation for her objections to the proposed 
figures for the budget and forecast and sought to come within 
the protections of the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Program.110 
In response, CEC maintained that Englehart failed to state 
a claim on which relief could be granted.  CEC’s objection was 
based on the fact that Englehart did not provide any information 
to the SEC and, therefore, could not come within the statutory 
definition of a whistleblower found at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6.111  The 
district court found in favor of CEC, finding that, “allowing 
individuals who do not satisfy the Dodd-Frank Reform Act 
definition of “whistleblower” to bring a claim under 15 U.S.C. § 
78u-6(h) would contradict the section’s title - ‘Protection of 
Whistleblowers’.”112  The court refused to second guess what it 
considered to be the unambiguous statutory language of Dodd-
Frank.113 
 
E. Bussing v. COR Clearing, LLC 
 
On May 21, 2014, less than two weeks after the decision in 
Englehart, the U.S. District Court for the District of Nebraska 
rejected the holding in Asadi and granted the plaintiff, Julie 
Bussing, relief under the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Protection 
Program and allowed her claim to continue.114  Bussing is a CPA 
who holds various Financial Industry Regulatory Authority 
(FINRA) licenses.115  Bussing worked as an independent 
contractor for COR Securities Holding, Inc. (COR) assisting with 
due diligence for the company’s acquisition of Legent Clearing, 
LLC, a company which had previously been investigated for 
FINRA violations.116  To help address Legent’s prior regulatory 
violations, Bussing developed a “Change of Control Plan” which 
was to be implemented following COR’s acquisition in 2012.117  
 
110. Id. at *7. 
111. Id. at *8. 
112. Id. at *22. 
113. Id. at *23. 
114. See Bussing v. COR Clearing, LLC, 20 F. Supp. 3d 719 (D. Neb. 
2014). 
115. Id. at 723. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
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COR offered Bussing the position of Executive Vice President of 
Legent, which she accepted only after she was assured the 
Change of Control Plan would be implemented.118 
On January 1, 2012 Bussing began to work for Legent.  
Although Christopher Frankel was CEO of Legent, Bussing was 
orally assured that she would report directly to Steven 
Sugarman, CEO of COR, and COR’s Board of Directors.  In April 
2012, FINRA began proceedings against Legent for various 
violations of financial rules and as part of those proceedings 
made requests for certain documents.  While she was preparing 
a response to FINRA’s requests, Bussing discovered additional 
violations and potential violations of securities regulations and 
FINRA rules.119  Although Sugarman and the COR directors 
initially approved of Bussing’s investigation and 
recommendations, very soon after Bussing began implementing 
auditing measures to assess potential violations, directors from 
both COR and Legent expressed dissatisfaction with her 
efforts.120  On April 29, 2012, Bussing submitted a report to COR 
and Legent with descriptions of violations of the Bank Secrecy 
Act and anti-money laundering rules and explanation of 
Legent’s inadequate internal record keeping.121  Bussing was 
asked to cease responding to FINRA’s requests.  She refused to 
do so.  On May 4, 2012, Bussing was told she needed a vacation 
and was put on paid leave, and, soon after, on approximately 
May 20, 2012, her employment was terminated.122 
Bussing brought twelve claims against COR and Legent, 
among them a claim alleging retaliation in violation of the 
whistleblower protection provision of Dodd-Frank.123  In 
response, COR filed a motion to dismiss.  The dispute on this 
issue centers, in part, on whether Bussing qualifies as a 
whistleblower despite the fact that she did not make any 
disclosures to the SEC.  Departing from the Fifth Circuit’s 
holding in Asadi, the district court ruled that the term 
“whistleblower” should be given its ordinary meaning for the 
 
118. Id. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. at 724. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. at 725. 
123. Id. at 726. 
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purposes of the retaliation section of the Act. The court stated, 
 
When it is apparent that Congress intended a 
word to be given its ordinary meaning, 
notwithstanding the presence of a statutory 
definition to the contrary, and when applying the 
definition to provision at issue would defeat that 
provision’s purpose, the Court will not 
mechanically read the statutory definition into 
that provision.124 
 
The court found it illogical that Congress intended to 
discourage internal reporting since internal reporting is often a 
more efficient way of dealing with potential violations in the 
workplace.125  The court, therefore, found that Bussing could 
pursue her claim.126 
 
VI. Public Policy Requires an Expansive Interpretation of 
Whistleblower 
 
Prudent public policy that protects the public interest 
requires an expansive interpretation of whistleblower 
protection.  SEC regulations that offer a broad interpretation of 
who may qualify as a whistleblower support one of the primary 
goals of financial reform, that of enhancing the ability of the SEC 
to enforce the securities laws.  As such, contrary to the 
conclusion of the Fifth Circuit in Asadi, the SEC regulations 
should be adopted and respected by the judiciary. 
Limiting protection from retaliation only to those 
individuals who report potential securities law violations 
directly to the SEC will undermine internal compliance 
programs.  Internal compliance programs have been put in place 
as a means of reducing fraudulent and illegal activity.  “The 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the Department of Justice’s 
Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations, 
and the SEC’s Seaboard Report, have long placed a premium on 
 
124. Id. at 729. 
125. Id. at 733. 
126. Id. at 734-35. 
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effective corporate compliance programs.  Complaint procedures 
have always been an integral part of any such program.”127  By 
incentivizing only direct reporting to the SEC, the Asadi court is 
supporting “a ‘race’ to the doorstep of the SEC”128 by the 
whistleblower.  Such a dynamic encourages reporting to the SEC 
before giving the company an opportunity to address and correct 
issues of concern.129 
Recognizing the need to ensure that the external reporting 
requirement does not undermine internal compliance the SEC, 
final SEC rules have made clear that (1) participating in a 
company’s internal reporting process could increase the amount 
of any bounty payment130 and (2) an internal report by a 
whistleblower that leads to a report by the company is 
considered a report to the SEC by the whistleblower as long as 
the information is provided to the SEC within 120 days of the 
internal reporting.131  “The final rules drafted by the SEC 
represent well-crafted regulations that strike a balance between 
internal and external reporting.”132 
“A perennial justification and a perennial objective of 
financial regulatory reform is the restoration of investor trust 
and confidence.”133  Enhancing the ability of the SEC to enforce 
securities laws will help boost public confidence in corporate 
America.  Furthermore, an expansive interpretation of who is a 
whistleblower will further Congress’ intent in passing Dodd-
Frank.  When the Act was passed, Sen. Christopher J. Dodd (D-
Conn.), who shepherded the bill through the Senate, said the 
 
127. Allan Dinkoff, Corporate Compliance Programs After Dodd-Frank 
(2011), available at 
http://www.weil.com/files/upload/corporate_compliance_post_dodd-
frank_aelc_oct.11.pdf. 
128. Justin Blount & Spencer Markel, The End of the Internal Compliance 
World as We Know It, or an Enhancement of the Effectiveness of Securities Law 
Enforcement? Bounty Hunting Under the Dodd-Frank Act’s Whistleblower 
Provisions, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 1023, 1039 (2012). 
129. Id. 
130. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6(a)(4) (2015). 
131. Id. § 240.21F-4(c)(3). 
132. Blount & Markel, supra note 128, at 1057. See also Geoffrey Rapp, 
Mutiny by the Bounties? The Attempt to Reform Wall Street by the New 
Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, 2012 BYU L. REV. 73 (2012). 
133. Ronald J. Colombo, Trust, Financial Services Regulation, and the 
Dodd-Frank Act, 30 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP. 8, 8 (2011). 
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legislation would help restore Americans’ confidence in the 
financial system.134  At the time of its passage in July 2010, he 
was quoted as saying, “More than anything else, my goal was, 
from the very beginning, to create a structure and architecture 
reflective of the 21st century in which we live, but also one that 
would rebuild that trust and confidence.”135 
Lastly, financial scandals invariably impact stock prices.136 
What really is at stake here involves the very foundation of the 
capitalist system and its inherent premise that investors are to 
be rewarded or penalized for taking financial risks in what is 
assumed to be a level playing field.  Bitter experience has shown 
that the system cannot be left to its own devices but needs the 
firm hand of regulatory oversight if it is to succeed in its mission 
of attracting investment for entrepreneurial ventures. 
Therefore, any regulatory reading of a statute that serves to firm 
up or bolster stock prices ought to be encouraged and promoted. 
A liberal interpretation of who is a whistleblower is such 
reading. 
For these reasons, it is imperative that the law provides 
incentives and broad protections for those individuals who risk 
their career and reputation by coming forward to expose 
corporate wrongdoing and chicanery. 
 
VII.      Conclusion 
 
A review of the whistleblower protections of Dodd-Frank, 
accompanying SEC regulations, and district court decisions of 
both interpretations, makes clear that the ambiguity of the 
statute should be resolved under the broad interpretation of the 
SEC regulations.  Viewing the definition of whistleblower 
narrowly and in isolation, as was done in Asadi, creates the 
illusion of clarity.  Under Section 21F subsection 6(a), a 
whistleblower is one who reports a violation of the securities 
exchange laws to the SEC.  But a statute should not be read in 
 
134. Brady Dennis, Congress Passes Financial Reform Bill, WASH. POST, 
July 16, 2010, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/07/15/AR2010071500464_pf.html. 
135. Id. 
136. Lynn A. Stout, The Investor Confidence Game, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 407, 
408 (2002). 
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the absence of its other provisions. The anti-retaliation 
subsection 6(h)(1)(A)(iii) describes other times when a 
whistleblower is to be protected, one of which being when a 
whistleblower makes disclosures to other parties, such as the 
disclosures required under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  This lack of 
a consistent reporting requirement calls into question 
Congress’s intended definition of whistleblower.  This failure of 
clarity creates the ambiguity.  The Supreme Court has said 
repeatedly that if the statute is ambiguous, it is for the agency 
to resolve this ambiguity in furtherance of the policy set forth in 
the statute.  Consequently, the courts should reject the 
conclusion of the Fifth Circuit in Asadi and instead defer to the 
SEC’s regulations.  This approach best supports the 
comprehensive reform goals of Dodd-Frank and its public policy 
mission to protect whistleblowers. 
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